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of an earlier relation. In the Frankel case this was an established fact,
but in the White-All/en case the lapse of over two years would seem to
interrupt this former relation so seriously as to preclude the application
of the arguments of the Frankel case. The White-Alllen case merely
reaffirms the general definition of a trade dispute in Ohio, while the
Frankel case has extended that definition to include disputes with non-
employees where there has been an immediately prior course of dealing
sufficient to imply an acceptance by the employer of this group as a lar-
gaining unit.
LEON N. STONE
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
CHATTEL LOAN ACT - HOLDER IN DUE, COURSE
A provision in General Code section 6346-5a, known as The Chat-
tel Loans Act, reads: "If interest, consideration, or charges in excess of
those permitted by this act shall be charged, contracted for, or received,
the contract and all papers in connection therewith shall be void and the
licensee shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest,
or charges Whatsoever." The case of Capitol Loan and Savings Co. v.
Biry, et ald, 134 Ohio St. 333, i6 N.E. (2d) 450, (1938), held
absolutely void a note and mortgage given by a borrower to a company
licensed under this Act. The loan was for less than $300.00 where
the chattel mortgage was on household goods, and, in addition to the
provisions for foreclosure proceedings authorized under the Act, the
mortgage contained a provision concerning default, and in that event,
provided for entry by the mortgagee " . . . into any building or upon
any premises where said property, or any part thereof, may be situated,
and take the same into its possession without process of law and dispose
of the same at any time thereafter, at public or private sale, and out of
the proceeds of said sale to pay first, the reasonable cost and expense of
taking, keeping, and selling the same and all court costs . . ." The
grounds relied upon by the court were that the note and mortgage were
to be considered as a part of the same transaction; Mc~lelland v. Sorter,
39 Ohio St. 12 (1883), that the excessive charges as defined by Gen-
eral Code section 6346-5, were "contracted for"; the statute providing
"the contract and all other papers in connection therewith shall be void
and the licensee (italics supplied) shall have no right to collect . . ."
The case was not affected by the fact that General Code section 8566,
provides only for an actual foreclosure proceeding in the case of a chattel
mortgage on household goods as was the case here, Myers, J., saying,
"This is a rather strange theory to attempt to justify, or excuse the illegal
provision in the chattel mortgage by the admission that it was in conflict
with two statutes instead of only one." Cf. Columbia Discount and
Loan Co. v Taylor, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 54; 6 Ohio Op. 279 (1936);
.Rebholz v. Family Loan Go., 6 Ohio Op. 82 (C.P.) (936), pro-
vision for attorney fees.
This case brings to the fore the interesting question as to the position
of the indorsee of such an instrument in the face of General Code sec-
tion 8307, which reads, "No debtor shall be deemed a particeps criminis,
on account of having paid or agreeing to pay, such exorbitant interest,
but he shall have like remedy and relief in either case. No bona fide
indorsee of negotiable paper purchased before due, shall be affected by
any usuary exacted by any former holder of such paper, unless he has
actual notice of the usury previous to his purchase. In such cases, the
amount of such excess, if incorporated in negotiable paper, after payment,
may be recovered back, by action against the party who originally exacted
the usury." This act is a part of the General Interest Law and has been
on the Ohio statute books since February i8, 1848. 43 Ohio Laws 55-
Shall we then, in a case between a bona fide indorsee of such an
instrument for value, and the maker allow the indorsee to recover the
face amount of such a note? On this precise question there seems to be
a dearth of authority. Yet if the note is void, the rule is violated that
instruments void by statute cannot be enforced even by one who is a
holder in due course. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 6th Ed.,
55, p. 616; 3 R.C.L. 225, p. 1I8; Citizens Bank v. Nore, 67 Neb.
69, 93 N.V. i6o, 2 Ann. Cas. 604, 6o L.R.A. 737 (1903); 3 R.C.L.
1017; io C.J.S. sections 5o2e, 503, p. iio8, iiio; Sabine v. Paine,
223 N.Y. 401, ii9 N.E. 849, 5 A.L.R. 1444 (i918), and see anno.
95 A.L.R. 735.
Although General Code section 6 346-5a says, "the contract and all
other papers in connection therewith shall be void," its language specifies
"and the licensee (italics supplied) shall have no right to collect." This
might well be interpreted as meaning that the note in such case is void
only between the licensee and the maker, io C.J.S. section 503, p. 1110.
Here the indorsee has given good consideration for a prima facie valid
instrument. The borrower has received actual value from the licensee.
General Code section 8307 provides recovery to the maker to the extent
of the usury exacted from him. So a position allowing recovery to the
indorsee can hardly be said to be essentially unfair. Further, it is the
policy of the Negotiable Instrument Law to make commercial paper as
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attractive and certain to purchasers as possible, and we ought not to
penalize a bona fide indorsee who is not a party to the original illegal
transaction, Brannan, supra.
On the other hand, one might reasonably view such a position as
making possible to licensees under the act a method for circumventing
the law, the policy as to which has been fully declared. Capitol Loan and
Savings Co. v. Biery, et al., supra; People v. Stokes, 281 Ill. 159, 118
N.E. 87, Cam. 277 (917); Geyerv. Spencer, 99 Ind. App. 418, 189
N.E. 429, (1934)- In Smetal Corp. v. Family Loan Co., Ii9 Fla.
497, 161 So. 438 (935), re the Florida Small Loan Act, the court
said at pp. 510, 5 II, "The statute was passed as a protection to the
borrower; it was intended to make the statute effective and to prevent
its evasion by endorsing notes given for such loans to third parties. It
would afford little protection to a borrower if the notes given contrary
to the statute would be valid in the hands of a holder in due course."
And see Hubachek, Annotations on Small Loan Laws, p. 175. As Gen-
eral Code section 6346-5a is a later statute than General Code section
8307 we should invoke the rule of construction that in the case of con-
flicting statutes a later statute dealing with some special subject matter
has precedence over a prior general enactment. Christman v. State ex
rel. Norris, 45 Ohio App. 541, 187 N.E. 584 (1932).
Furthermore, the position of the indorsee is not that of one denied
justice. He has his action against the licensee on his warranty, Ohio
General Code 8171, Ohio Jur. p. 1072, and possibly in quasi-contract
if the note is cancelled as void; See, Family Loan Co. v. Smetal Corp.,
123 Fla. 9oo, 169 So. 48 (1936). At the same time the culprit exceed-
ing the limits of his authority, expressly defined by the legislature in the
Act, is held to the limit of his responsibility as set by that body, and the
small and necessitous borrower gets the benefit which Gen. Code sec-
tion 6346-5a was intended to confer upon him. Northern Finance Co.
v. Weiss, 31 N.P. (NS) 196 (933); Hubachek, supra, p. 175. Stat-
utes must be construed so as to give them effect, if possible. State ex rel.
Allen County Law Library Ass'n v. Welker, 47 Ohio App. 42, 190
N.E. 150 (1934). And the construction of a statute depends on its
effect, not on the form it may be made to assume. Hill v. Micham, i16
Ohio St. 549, 157 N.E. 13 (1927). The general policy of the Nego-
tiable Instrument Law in protecting bona fide indorsees ought not to be
controlling in this case because: (i) only a fraction of the great mass
of commercial paper can possibly be affected (i.e. loans by licensees of
less than $3oo.oo at more than 3 per cent per month plus costs allowed
by the statute; loans by licensees of more than $300.00 at more than
242
8 per cent per annum; loans by non-licensees of less than $300.00 at
more than 8 per cent per annum), and (2) the statute is a police regu-
lation, State v. Powers, 125 Ohio St. io8, ISo N.E. 647 (932);
People v. Stokes, supra; aimed at the protection of the small borrower
which should include the "economically absurd luxury" of litigation as
well as usury. It would not, under the circumstances, seem to be too
harsh to require purchasers of such paper from licensees to inquire as to
its validity. Finally General Code section 8307 was probably never
intended to be applied to void instruments. Extended search fails to
show a single occasion where it has been invoked to save the holder of
a void instrument. The fact that the indorsee is not a party to the illegal
transaction carries no weight. General Code section 8307 specifically
declares the victim of usury not a particeps criminis. The indorsee seeks
to invoke a part of the Interest Law to give life to an instrument declared
void by the legislature as a police measure. It is hard to believe that the
legislature would have intended to have this police measure circum-
vented by mere indorsement to a bona fide purchaser.
J. GARETH HrrcHcoCc
PLEADING
ELECTION OF REMEDIES - MASTER-SERVANT RELATIONSHIP
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant on the theory
of respondeat superior for injuries received in an automobile accident
caused by the negligence of the defendant's servant. While the action
was pending, the plaintiff filed an action directly against the servant.
Service was had but no answer was filed and the case went to default
judgment. The court, upon motion, dismissed the suit against the
master on the ground that the plaintiff's judgment against the servant
constituted an election of his remedies and was a bar to his recovery
against the master. On appeal it was held that the granting of such
motion was error. In refusing to require election, the court said that
the plaintiff had two consistent substantial remedies which are not repug-
nant to each other and he might pursue each separately, that is, he
might pursue the master and he might pursue the servant separately but
he can have only one satisfaction. Land v. Berzin, 26 Ohio L. Abs.
703 (1938).
The doctrine of election of remedies may be broadly defined as a
choice made with knowledge between two inconsistent substantial rights,
either of which may be instituted at the instance of the chooser, who
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